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LOOKING AT OURSELVES
Thoughts on Process and Product in Applied Systems Analysis
- William C. Clark -
September 1975
This paper raises some issues concerning the practice
and utilization of applied systems analysis. In order to
provide a common point of departure, I begin with a lengthy
quote from Howard Raiffa's excellent "partial answer" to
the question "What is applied systems analysis?" He writes:
"Our Institute interprets ASA not as a technique
or even a set of techniques but as an embracing
rational approach to the resolution of complex
problems. ASA is a framework of thought designed
to help decision-makers choose the desirable (or
in some cases a "best") course of action. The
approach may entail such steps as:
- recognizing the existence of a problem or of
a constellation of interconnected problems worthy
of, and amenable to, analysis:
- defining and bounding the extent of the problems
area - to simplify the problems to the point of
analytic tractability and at the same time to pre-
serve all vital aspects affected by possible
solutions:
- identifying a hierarchy of goals and objectives
and examining value tradeoffs:
- generating appropriate decision alternatives
for examination.
- modeling the complex, dynamic interrelation-
ships amongst various facets of the problem,
taking cognizance of the uncertainties inherent
and realizing that decision rules incorporating
feedback mechanisms can be employed.
- evaluating potential courses of action and
investigating the sensitivity of the results
to the assumptions made and to facets of the
problems excluded from the formal analysis: and
- implementing the results of the analysis.
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Precisely because ASA is a rational approach
rather than a technique, this list of
steps should be understood in a quali-
fied sense. Not all the steps need be
included in every instance of respon-
sible systems analysis. Some steps
may be handled in a more formal manner
than others. The order of the steps
can be varied or iterated in various
patterns - thus the importance of
excluded factors may be repeatedly
reassessed or the relevance of the
objective structure periodically exa-
mined. The most useful models will
mimic reality with sufficient precision
to serve a broad spectrum of decisions
and decision makers. The decision
stage may therefore be diffuse and
broad and follow the completion of the
formal scientific analysis.
In summary, ASA aspired to promote
good decision making. As a process it
is intended to focus and to force hard
thinking about large, complex problpms.
Where feasible, ASA makes use of auto-
mated techniques for computation and
decision resolution.
As we are using the term "applied
systems analysis", the discipline is
interpreted in a broad inclusive sense.
It is an umbrella term incorporating
under its span such fields as: opera-
tions research and management science;
cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit
analysis; planning, programming, and
budgeting (PPB); decision analysis;
many aspects of cybernetics, information
theory, artificial intelligence, manage-
ment information and control systems,
computer science, dynamic modeling,
behavioral decision theory, and organiza-
tion theory. That ASA embraces such a
wide range of scientific activities
reflects the increasingly apparent inter-
connection and interdependencies among
these activities. Not one of the fields
realizes its potential in isolation from
the others nor can the increasingly
complex problems of modern societies be
efficiently resolved without the coordina-
ted collaboration of these different
disciplines. "I
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This is undoubtedly the most thoughtful, comprehensive,
and mature view of ASA I have encountered. It sets a
rigorous standard for good applied systems analysis which, if
taken seriously, can provide individuals and institutions
concerned with ASA a difficult and exciting challenge indeed.
There are even some signs, after two years of work, that
IIASA is making progress towards Raiffa's ideal.
My concern here, however, is not with the ｰ ｲ ｯ ｧ ｾ ･ ｳ ｳ Ｌ but
with the standard itself. Our present concept of good ASA
necessarily implies two assumptions:
(1) It is socially desireable to make decisions in
the most rational manner possible, and
(2) The details of the ASA process, i.e. the sequencing
of Raiffa's "steps", do not significantly effect the nature
of the ASA product.
In the body of this paper I argue that these assumptions
are at very least open to question, and in all likelihood
quite unjustifyable. Present practice relies completely on
the validity on these assumptions and criticism of the latter
necessarily implies some fairly fundamental misgivings as to
the appropriate conduct and utilization of ASA.
I do not seek to denigrate the real strengths and advan-
tages of good ASA, and do not have in mind any specific
alternatives to the viewpoint expressed by Raiffa above.
But ASA and even IIASA are finally beginning to corne of age,
and both could surely benefit from a bit of serious, if
unaccustomed, introspection at this point in their histories.
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A Need to Look at Ourselves
During its first two years of existence IIASA has put a
good deal of time, money, and talent into analyzing the
design and impact of policy decisions in energy, environ-
mental, urban, and other systems. It is curious, given this
precedent, that we have never given even passing attention to
the design and impact of ASA itself.
The analysis of ASA is not a trivial or academic matter.
Knowledge has always been among the most powerful and conta-
gious products of mankind, and the impacts of such technolo-
gical innovations as the automobile, DDT, and even controlled
fission pale in comparison to those-of such information
organizers as the printing press, television, and computer.
Good ASA is an information organizer par excellance, and it
would be surprizing indeed were its successful promotion not
to result in a variety of substantial, complex, and far
reaching impacts. What these impacts are likely to be,
whether they are unambiguously desireable in the broader
social context, and how they might be constructively altered,
are questions we cannot answer because they are questions we
have not yet bothered to ask.
Similarly free from any explicit analysis is the design
of the ASA process itself. Raiffa describes seven inter-
related steps which may be included in an analysis, these
ranging from "recognizing the existence of a problem", through
"identifying a hierarchy of goals" and "modeling .... the
problem", to "implementing the results of the analysis."
Surely the particular fashion in which these steps are
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intercalated into the overall process in not likely to be
irrelevant to the nature of a given ASA result. And yet,
once more, we have failed to pose the issue and are con-
sequently incapable of contemplating either its importance
or its resolution.
IIASA is explicitly in the business of developing and
promoting ASA as a vehicle for increasing the impact of
knowledge - more precisely, the impact of rationality - on
the decision making process. Were ASA a traditional techno-
logical innovation rather than a subtle conceptual one, we
already would have noted its potential social impact with
no little alarm, and subjected its internal workings to no
mean scrutiny. In fact, however, we have been kept from
undertaking such a serious analysis of our own affairs by
an aversion to self-examination which is as understandable
as it is unjustifyable. This regretable history notwith-
standing, there can remain little question that ASA - or,
if preferred, "knowledge systems" - presently constitute a
proper and even urgent subject for study at IIASA and
elsewhere.
In the remainder of this paper I advance some tentative
thoughts on what issues such a study might address, and what
factors seem likely to prevent IIASA in particular and
systems analysts in general from undertaking the study at
all.
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Our Aversion to Mirrors
A serious study of ASA effects is in fact the last
thing we are likely to attempt at IIASA. It is not even
clear that we could successfully carry one out with all
the good intentions in the world.
First, for the metaphysicians, there is the epistemo-
logical problem of whether a thing can know itself. Pose
this question in any of its historical forms - can ｾ ｯ ､
know god, can a brain build a model of itself, can
psychiatrists be expected to lead better adjusted lives
than others -and the answer comes out equally ambiguous.
But it would seem overly self-serving to abandon our
inquest on such amorphous grounds before it is begun.
The second likely barrier is related to the first but
strikes much closer to horne. We all have our pet little
disciplinary preferences and perspectives, more or less
central to our more or less dis-integrated views of the
world. Of course the fact that we are applied systems
analysts should mean that we are interested in applications,
and the fact that we are interested in applications should
mean that we pay some sort of attention to other disci-
plines. But few of us are sufficiently saintly or naive
to seriously believe that there isn't a lot of "I want to
see my technique (or perspective) applied" in even our most
sincere efforts to bring about effective applications of
systems analysis. Perhaps this sort of narrow self-interes
is necessary to provide the requisite driving force for the
enterprise, though I would hope we could teach ourselves to
jo better.
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But to teach ourselves we would have to consider
seriously the impact and ramifications of our narrowness
of view, and that is just what we seem unwilling to do,
both as persons and as an institution. Such a self-
examination would hurt, to be sure, and all the more so
because of our rather self-righteous and uncritical
acceptance of our present endeavours as a priori virtuous
ones. This strong aversion to mirrors is sadly and
clearly evidenced, in case there should be any doubt, by
the essential failure of IIASA directorate, projects, and
scientists to recognize the difference between making
better decisions and making better use of a set of tech-
niques or, at most, a particular "framework of thought."
How many of us have seriously faced the issue posed so
neatly by some forgotten cogitator:
"Are you doing the right thing?
Or just doing the thing right?"
Finally, there is a political factor mitigating against
a critical examination of ASA impacts on society. Without
imparting any motives to anyone, we can surely agree with
Bacon - and heaven knows who else - that (organized) know-
ledge is power. Just as much of ASA's high impact poten-
tial derives from its ready translation into control, so
its attractiveness to many potential users derives from the
ready translation of that control into power. Without
stretching the imagination - or, for that matter, histori-
cal precedent in the NMO's - one can conjure up images of
ASA providing the knowledge/control/power for all manner of
admirable and not so admirable uses. It would be naive to
think that the power potential of ASA is not recognized in
the NMOs, or that there are not proponents of our work
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specifically interested in its (political) power implica-
tions. It is not the nature of such individuals or
interests - whatever their nationalities - to sponsor
studies such as the recommended ASA self-examination, when
those studies are bound to make explicit and perhaps under-
mine their goals. Lest this last paragraph be interpreted
in the wrong perspective, however, let me close by noting
without further explanation that it seems likely that the
really worrisome impacts of ASA are not those to be inflicted
on society by some systems-conscious Big Brother, but rather
those which will come along relatively passively, riding on
the backs of us good but simple ASA missionaries.
And so, as they say in the trade, the priors seem very
much against our undertaking a critical examination of ourselves
and our Gospel. But what if we did? Without pretending to
have carried out the comprehensive and systematic analysis of
this problem which a good ASA study would require, I'd like to
turn now to some of the more obvious points which 'would almost
certainly emerge from the inquiry.
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Through the Looking Glass: Evaluating the effect of systems
analysis on systems. I. ASA as product
Raiffa's comments quoted earlier make it explicitly
clear that the desired product of the ASA process is
rational decision-making. And ｈ ｾ ｦ ･ ｬ ･ Ｌ in a thoughtful
review of experience in the energy field, concludes that
the ultimate role of ASA is in establishing "a rationale
for the formalization of the debate. ,,2
For the moment, let me assume the ASA process to be
given, and to be successful in attaining its goal. (I will
return later to a discussion of the process in its own
right). Granting that assumption, an inquiry into the
broader implications of ASA becomes an attempt to assess
the social effects of generally increasing the rationality
content of decisions and decision-making.
It is essential to perceive, in contradiction to con-
ventional dogma, that even this "pure form" of a
rationality-increasing ASA is manifestly value laden.
Furthermore, the underlying value presumption can be simply
and precisely identified: ASAcontains a dominant prefer-
ence for the rational as opposed to irrational, a-rational,
post-rational, or any other form of process and product in
decision-making. We cannot make this preference any less
of a value judgement by repeating over and over again (as
ASA practioners are wont to do) "Well, of course you want
to be rational; its just a question of what you want to be
rational about ... " On the contrary, there are some real
alternatives to the rationalist presumption. The works of
the early existentialists, of Bergson, of Levi-Strauss,
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and others explicitly refute the goal itself.) Simon
and the incrementalists attack the rationalist presump-
tion on pragmatic grounds and endorse at least non-
rational methods of practical decision making. 4
Similarly, Meyerson, Banfield, Hirshman, Wildavsky, and
others have produced quite enlightening social science
research by consciously rejecting the rationalist
assumption as an underlying model. 5 This roster could be
extended at some length, even without calling on the
psycho-analytical or non-western literature for support.
The point here is that our proposed self-examination
cannot concern itself only with questions of technical
efficacy, viewing ASA as one of several possible processes
which might be adopted to attain a generally agreed upon
goal. Rather, we must recognize that the adoption of
ASA constitutes, above all else, a value statement about
goals. A statement which explicitly holds that maximum
attainable rationality is a desirable characteristic of
decisions independent of, and perhaps in contradiction to,
other similarly value-laden goals. It follows that our
evaluation of ASA must be preceded by an explicit value
statement as to the desired nature of decision-making in a
given society. If rationality of decision is chosen as
our predominant goal, then good ASA (in the Raiffa sense)
should certainly be considered one of the primary tools of
our goal seeking repertoire. But if some other goal is
judged to have a dominant or even shared position in our
social value structure, then we must recognize that ASA
alone is inherently incapable of attaining that goal.
Further, we must understand that the use of ASA -
-11-
inexorably if implicitly invoking the rationalist pre-
sumption - may be fundamentally antithetical to the
realization of our non-rationalist goals.
A pointed example of the effects of ASA'a rationalist
presumption has been raised by Karl Popper. He argues, in
effect, that ASA's comprehensive and compelling search for
positive values is plausibly conducive to the development
of totalitarian societies. Societies in which utopian
goals are systematically pursued in ways which, precisely
because they are essentially rational and nothing else,
"may easily lead to an intolerable increase of human
suffering. ,,6 The argument - which I will not develop here -
is largely based on the observed implicit substitution of
aggregate material welfare and efficiency considerations
for those of individual liberty and justice in the social
goal structure. Popper's case is a compelling one with
respect to actual behaviour of known political systems,
though he does not pretend to offer a rigorous proof that
comprehensive adoption of the rationalist view must neces-
sarily lead to nondemocratic government. Arrow's so-called
"impossibility theorem" comes much closer to such a proof,
and may reasonably be interpreted in the present context
as demonstrating the ultimate incompatability of democratic
and rationalist values. 7 In the end, one of these values
must be explicitly judged to have priority over the other.
The central point of the present essay is that ASA philos-
ophy and practice are intrinsically incapable of recognizing
either the necessity or the implications of such a value
judgement.
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A particularly chilling example of this insensitivity
on the part of applied systems analysts was provided
recently by Dennis Meadows. Asked by Business Week to
explain his recommendation of a "subtle decentralized
process" of social planning, Meadows replied:
"In our study of corporations, we found
that the really outstanding companies
- Polaroid and IBM for example - tend
to have a small leadership, maybe one
guy, able to diffuse throughout the
organization a concept of goals and
values. He pushes these down, not
decisions. It guides people in a
fashion much more coordinated than
you'd have with central planning. We
have the capability to achieve that.
It takes an image." (8)
Exactly.
Nowhere in Meadows does one find the slightest recog-
nition of the bitter historical lessons which such "one
guy" self-appointed lIimage diffusers" have inflicted on us
in the last half century. And Meadows is in no way alone.
The much-touted British Blueprint for survival 9 , for
example, reflects an equally cavalier and missionary atti-
tude on the part of well intentioned analysts. Popper's
observation that entire societies can - and have - quite
unconsciously allowed the rationalist value choice to be
made for them, simply through their passive acquiescence to
(and even enthusiastic adoption of) a growing body of more
"highly rational" control and planning approaches, makes
the value issue an even more urgent and critical one.
The sorts of problems contingent on ASA's dominant
rationalist presumption can be usefully highlighted by
one more set of examples, this time with immediate
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practical import.
We can all cite specific cases of applies systems
analysis where it was not sufficient just to get the answer
"right". ｈ ｾ ｦ ･ ｬ ･ sadly notes such a situation with respect
to reactor licensing in his "Hypotheticality" paper. 10 Anyone
in the energy field is all too aware of similar difficulties
with respect to plant-siting studies. Even when no one
disagrees with any stage of the analysis - including its
.
implicit treatment of "multiple conflicting objectives,
preferences, and tradeoffs" - the right rational answer ends
up being irrationally rejected by the political system
necessary for its implementation.
I am not referring to bad analysis here. In particular,
I am not referring to analysis which neglects Raiffa's last
step of "implementation". There is little enough of value
written on this subject, to be sure, and less actually
accomplished. 11 The small body of implementation work which
does identify itself as part of a broader ABA study generally
seeks only to identify the difficulties imposed on an other-
wise correct policy design procedure by the misallocated
resources, power politics, and other (regretably) irrational
aspects of the situation, and to steer a pragmatic rational
course through these obstacles. Even the best of these
implementation-conscious ASA studies, meeting each of Raiffa's
previously stated criteria, still completely fail to recog-
nize that correct and comprehensive rational inference alone
is and should be an essentially insufficient criteria for
the "rightness" of a policy.
In republican society, a government derives the authority
to implement proposals from its perceived performance - past,
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present, and future - as a representative and legitimate
mediator of citizens' rights and interests. What deter-
mines the nature of these perceptions is not primarily the
"rightness" of the proposals, but rather the responsiveness
of the system as a whole to citizens' desires, rational or
otherwise. The system relies for the legitimate authority
necessary to implement proposals not so much on the nature
of the individual proposals themselves, but on the nature of
. . 12
the process employed to design and select those proposals.
This, of course, is nothing astounding, being merely a
restatement of the basic principle of (almost) obligatory
minority compliance in a representative government. But
note the internal contradictions and ultimate instability of
the alternatives: A government which secures compliance of
citizens only when they feel a given decision is "right" is
doomed to an existence of either partial compliance, which
is often sufficient to render the decision and the govern-
ment null and void,or of total thought control designed to
make the "rightness" of government-sponsored decisions a
tautological matter of definition. Neither extreme is un-
precedented in modern society, but it is clear that for
concertive government action to be possible in a nontotali-
tarian context, the political implementation system must be
such that it retains its legitimate right to implement even
when some of its proposed implementations are (perceived to
be) "wrong". This is an impossible contradiction for an
essentially rationalist system which has no source of legi-
timacy other than the presumed (but inevitably disputed)
"rightness" of its decisions. On the other hand, such
transcendence of individual decisions per se by the process
of arriving at those decisions is the explicit strength of
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the inefficient, nonrational systems of bargaining, com-
promise and periodic elections which characterize Popper's
archtype "Open Society".
The expected result of replacing the process-based
implementation systems of political compromise with product-
based ones of rationalist ASA is to force either impotence
or totalitarianism on the implementing government. Hafele's
comments emphasize the former fate, Popper's the latter. In
either event, the adoption of ASA and its rationalist goals
as a foundation for social decision-making does not seem to
be an altogether innocuous or desireable social undertaking.
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Through the Looking Glass: Evaluating the Effect of Systems
Analysis on Systems. II. ASA as Process
Raiffa's description of ASA lists seven "steps" or
disciplinary components which might be included in the ana-
lysis process. These are portrayed in a highly shematic and
arbitrary manner in Figure 1, the caption to which should be
consulted by those presently in need of a footnote.
The issue to be addressed here is whether the particular
process through which these components are integrated can
effect the analysis' final product. By ASA process, I simply
mean the way in which we guide the analysis through the
"steps" of Figure 1. This includes our choice of starting
point, our sequence of iterating through the steps, and the
emphasis we give to each step.
Raiffa's description and most ASA applications imply that
detailed process considerations are properly matters of
expediency and minimally significant in determining the
nature of the ultimate ASA product. In particular, they claim
that a sufficient condition for good analysis is simply that
all steps be considered in one or more iterations of arbitrary
starting point and sequence.
Experience at IIASA and elsewhere indicates that this pre-
valent view of process irrelevance is almost certainly wrong,
d .. 1 h 13 h . .an pern1sc10uS y so at tat. T e argument 1S not a r1go-
rous or particularly edifying one, to be sure. But a review
of the available evidence strongly suggests that we would be
justified - and as proponents of ASA may be obliged - to
undertake a study of the ASA process in its own right. I will
summarize below the three most obvious lines of related
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argument, the first dealing with the particuiar disciplin-
ary prejudices introduced into the analysis by each of the
component steps; the second with the product implications
imposed by the initial orientation adopted in a given ASA
process; and the last - really more speculation than
argument - with possible implications of alternative
sequences of process iteration.
It should be stressed that I do not pretend to fully
comprehend the implications of these process considerations
for ASA practice and utilization. My aim is not to show
which process we should be using, but merely to argue that
process considerations are almost certainly bound to make
a difference in the character of our analysis results. If
this is in fact the case, or even if it is only a plausible
case, then the study of ASA process per se becomes a prere-
quisite to development of a self-conscious and useful science
of applied systems analysis. It is our failure to effec-
tively recognize the propriety and importance of such a
study, rather than any anticipation of its results, which
has provided the motivation for this Section.
Disciplinary Prejupices
The analysis steps referred to by Raiffa consist of
fairly narrow discipline oriented activities, whose integra-
tion is one goal of the ASA process. It is readily apparent
that these disciplinary steps are in no way neutral proces-
sors of the analysis problem. Rather, each step tends to
impart certain characteristics of its own to the analysis,
thereby introducing a more or less systematic distortion of
the problem initially addressed. In order to compensate for
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these distortions through the overall analysis process,
it is necessary to understand their nature and origins in
Some detail. We do not yet have such an understanding -
at least not in any systematic, ASA-relevant sense - but
several concrete examples will serve to illustrate the
sorts of points at issue.
Ad hoc modelling: Starting close to home, there is the
. 14forest pest or budworm project of IIASA's Ecology Group.
To give us due credit, this is a good ASA study by state-
of-the-art standards. It has incorporated substantial
research at each step of the ASA process illustrated in
Figure 1, and has been concerned from the beginning with
serving the management needs of its clients. But we began
the analysis, as ecologists, with a dynamic simulation of
forest/insect interactions. And 15 or more man-years
into the study, anyone can see that what we really have is
still an ecological model with some ASA technique 'stuck on.
Our decision analysis, optimization, alternative eva-
luation, and even implementation activities were, above all
else, acts performed on an ecological model, and only inci-
dentally integral steps in the analysis of a policy problem.
It is clear to all of us involved that the results of our
analysis are qualitatively different than those likely to
have been obtained had (say) a team of economists taken a
lead role in the analysis. Would it have been more appro-
priate for our forest manager clients to consult a team of
economists, trading ecological for economic bias? Would
some alternative process of iterating through Figure 1's
steps have mitigated the ecological bias of the analysis?
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These are the sorts of urgent questions which ASA as a
would-be discipline has not even begun to ask.
If the Ecology Group allowed its analysis to be domi-
nated by cause-and-effect dynamics, however, other studies
have had other problems. Referring again to Figure 1, it
is possible to draw from contemporary experience the
likely prejudices to be introduced by each of the disci-
plinary areas involved.
Boundary conditions:. Brewer's review of urban ASA work
shows how the ultimate analysis product can be dominated by
the ostensibly tactical goal of assessing boundary condi-
tions. The same assessment could be made of most work done
under the International Biological Program (IBP) and its
heir-apparent Man and the Biosphere (MAB). All of these
cases show that the most likely result of an initial orienta-
tion to boundary condition assessment is simply stagnation of
the analysis. In those few efforts which do not die of this
affliction, an extremely conservative bias invariably per-
sists through the ensuing ASA effort. It appears that with
so much committed to detailed description of some initial
view of the analysis problem, the process becomes very reluc-
tant to modify that view as the analysis proceeds through its
iterations. To do so would be to render large components of
the previously assembled data base irrelevant or obsolete,
and to reveal other components previously uninvestigated.
The problem, of course, is that it is precisely such an
iterative revision and redefinition of the analysis problem
which a good ASA effort must accomplish.
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Theory and "laws": much of the history of applied
economics can be seen as the intentional direction of
entire societies' policy design systems by a normative
model of "efficient resource allocation", even though
normative theory and "laws" are supposed to represent only
one step of the overall analysis process.
Outside of the Marxist tradition, Lewis Mumford's
writings constitute one of the most thoughtful and exten-
16
sive investigations of this phenomenon. And, however
weak and reactionary its detailed arguments, the essentially
Luddist stance of much of the environmental crisis litera-
ture should at least receive credit for recognizing the
value content of the efficiency credo. Finally, the arch-
type example of theory achieying a dominant role in the
?rocess is provided by benefit-cost analysis and its enthu-
siastic adoption by a great variety of decision makers.
Once more, good benefit-cost work can certainly play an
important role in articulating a framework for policy
analysis. We need not denigrate this potential to observe
that in practice the "favourable benefit-cost ratio" has
11 t ft b 1 · . If 17a 00 0 en ecome a goa ln ltse . This, of course,
is an instance of where ASA-process considerations spill
over into ASA-product considerations of the previous Section.
Specifying goals and objectives: Unwanted process
effects have also resulted from a preoccupation with the
specification of goals and objectives. The best documented
case is probably that of the Programmed Planning and
Budgeting System (PPBS), a self-styled "systems approach"
disasterously introduced into government budgeting without
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consideration (or recognition) of its own substantial
I. 18 .11mpact on that system. Alternatively, there 1S the
critique of obsessive ends-orientation advanced by the
I
lincrementalist school in their attacks on comprehensive
1 . 19P ann1ng.
Optimization: Optimization techniques are the stock-
in-trade of operations researchers, and operations
researchers probably constitute the majority of ｳ ･ ｾ ｦ Ｍ
conscious applied systems analysts. It should not be
surprizing, in this context, that ostensibly broad ranging
ASA studies turn out to be narrow optimization exercises
in a regretably large number of cases. The problem here
is that successful optimizations require relatively simple
views of both problem and objectives, and analysts deter-
mined to employ formal optimization techniques invariably
impose the requisite simplicity on their problems.
Of course, one of the most important arts of ASA is
problem simplification and bounding - Raiffa even lists
these activities among his basic analysis steps. But
simplification is a means properly directed towards the end
of better decision making per se. If it is justified
instead in terms of the requirements of analytic technique,
then we are back again in the product trap of defining
successful analysis itself as our goal. One look at the
publication titles emerging from RAND, IIASA, and their
brethren is enough to confirm one's suspicion that optimiza-
tion requirements often do dominate the character of the
20ASA product.
-22-
Decision analysis: As much as its practitioners would
like to believe to the contrary, even decision analysis
(even decision analysis with multiple conflicting objectives,
preferences, and value tradeoffs) tends to impart a persis-
tant desciplinary prejudice to analysis problems. As in the
case of optimization, much of the potentially distorting
effect of the decision analysis step derives from its tech-
nical limitations. The (misguided?) skill and vigor with
which a good applied decision analyst will try to convince
his client of the irrelevance of these technical constraints
must be experienced to be believed: A related but much more
subtle point concerns the discrepancy between people's
willingness to take risks as reflected in their answers to
decision analysts' questions, and their willingness to take
. k fl d' h' b h' 21 U 'I d . .rlS.S as re ecte ln t elr own e aVlour. ntl eC1Slon
analysis as a discipline is able and willing to differen-
tiate between preferences in action and preferences under
interrogation, the proper mode of utilization and 'integra-
tionof their techniques in the overall ASA process will be
impossible to assess.
Initial Orientation of the Analysis
As noted earlier, for nearly all of us the majority of
our training and experience lies in very few techniques,
problem solving philosophies, and/or subject matter areas. 22
In this world, problems are not attacked by "applied systems
analysts", but by operations researchers, economists, deci-
sion theorists, or whatever, who have adopted to greater or
lesser extent what Raiffa calls the ASA "framework of thought".
And most interdisciplinary research, whatever its strengths,
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does not alter this situation.
As a result of this inescapable preconditioning, even
the truest of believers in ASA carry with them a great
store of essentially disciplinary preconceptions and pre-
delictions. This heritage almost invariably determines
the effective initial orientation of their analyses. Thus,
faced with the same ASA problem and agreeing wholeheartedly
and sincerely on the necessary steps to be taken in the
analysis, the erstwhile decision theorist begins with a
look at the political role players; the mathematician
searches for structural analogies; the OR refugee seeks a
quantity to be optimized; the economist establishes a
foothold on existing misallocations of something or other;
one breed of natural scientists begins manipulating exist-
ing behavioural data; another inquires after causal rela-
tionships of the relevant system.
This discipline-determined selection of starting points
for the ASA process is characteristic of almost all actual
systems work (as opposed to systems philosophy), and des-
cribes the situation at IIASA quite accurately. It follows
that the "natural" ASA process is one in which an initial
disciplinary orientation - and, by inference from the argu-
ments advanced earlier, an initial disciplinary prejudice -
is imposed on the analysis as an incidental consequence of
the analyst's upbringing. This might constitute little
more than a curiosity if those initial prejudices were
systematically dissipated in the course of the ensuing ASA
process. In fact, however, they are not. There seem to be
two reasons for this.
The first is that the vast majority of analysis efforts
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badly underestimate time requirements and, whatever their
pious intentions, end up devoting (say) 90% of the analysis
to 10% of the problem. Predictably, most of that analysis
" d' h . h h' h h b . 23t1me 1S consume 1n t e step W1t w 1C t e process eg1ns.
The second factor responsible for perpetuating the
disciplinary prejudices of the initial analysis orientation
is more subtle but at least as important as the first.
Perhaps the easiest way to envision the situation I have in
mind is as one of analysis "inertia", which would work some-
thing like this:
A particular initial orientation to the analysis process
imparts a specific disciplinary character to the early ana-
lysis results, in the fashion suggested earlier. The process
then moves on to sUbsequent steps inherantly capable of
moving the analysis in a direction which dilutes the influence
of the starting position. But these subsequent analysis steps
do not work with the pure, unformed problem originally encoun-
tered in the analysis (shades of structuralism) . Rather, they
receive the problem after one or more steps of previous ana-
lysis, with a more or less strong disciplinary component
already incorporated. Again, for a self-conscious science of
ASA we would need to understand better the nature of these
"inertial" effects following from initial analysis orientation.
We presently lack such understanding and have shown no signs
of wanting to alleviate our ignorance.
Sequence of Iteration
It seems very likely that not only the starting point but
also the specific sequence of analysis steps will have an
effect on the final ASA product. We can plausibly extend
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the notion of "inertial" effect referred to in the discussion
of initial process orientation to suggest that a sequence
"SPECIFYING GOALS - MODELING - DEVELOPING POLICY ALTERNATIVES
- ... " would lead to a different product than the sequence
"SPECIFYING GOALS - DEVELOPING POLICY ALTERNATIVES - MODELING
"... .
Furthermore, on a priori grounds alone it would seem
highly unlikely that ASA problems should have formally unique
solutions. It follows that different process (i.e. sequence)
approaches to a given analysis problem would be likely to
yield different answers. It requires but one more little
leap of faith to assume that some such answers would be
"better" than others and thus, once again, the understanding
and choice of ASA process becomes a matter of real practical
concern. Unfortunatley, the lack of good ASA efforts with
adequate process documentation forces me to leave this last
aspect of the process argument at a largely hypothetical
level. But it would seem reasonable to suggest that the
burden of proof lies with those who contend that one can
procede through an arbitrary sequence of Figure 1's steps
without concern for the effect of that sequence on our ana-
lysis results.
In summary, despite the ambiguities and incidental
nature of the arguments cited here, the following conclu-
sions seem justified:
* Each component of the ASA process imparts a distinct
disciplinary character to the ultimate product of the
analysis.
* The sequence in which each disciplinary component is
invoked in a given ASA process is likely to influence the
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the relative contribution of each component to the ultimate
product.
* The effective sequence in which components are
invoked is a largely implicit function of the disciplinary
background of the analysis group, rather than an explicit
choice based on analysis goals.
In short, the specific character of the ASA process is
highly relevant to the specific character of ASA product.
In order to improve that product it is necessary to better
understand the nature of these relationships. In particular,
we need to better understand the intrinsic prejudices of both
problem recognition and solution generation which charac-
terize various ASA techniques, and the sequential interplay
of these techniques in the dynamic analysis process. It
seems almost certain that such an understanding would lead
to specification of nonarbitrary sequencing rules for the ASA
process. Such understanding is equally certain to be a pre-
requisite for a nontrivial and self-conscious science of ASA
per se, a science consisting of more than the present blithe
check-list approach to disciplinary "integration". Whether
IIASA or its scientists have an interest in developing or
even discussing this sort of ASA science remains to be seen.
It would be important research, and it would, of necessity,
be highly original. But it would also be difficult, uncertain
and not particularly ingratiating to those committed to ele-
gant displays of their present presumed proficiency. The
issue is an important one but, in all fairness, IIASA's stance
on it probably is not.
If IIASA doesn't choose seriously to pursue good applied
systems analysis, someone else eventually will. 24
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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ｆ ｩ ｧ ｵ ｲ ･ ｾ Ｎ What we do now in ASA
The figure represents a realistically dis-integrated
perspective of what we do now in applied systems analysis.
Ideally, our perspective on ASA would come from the
outside, looking in. That is, it would take its orienta-
tion from considerations of what I have referred to as the
"Policy Design System", "Decision-Making Process", or "Issue-
Machine".
Unfortunately, most ASA efforts get this quite backward
and adopt a perspective originating on the inside, looking
(a little bit) out. The majority of analysts corne endowed
with predilections towards one particular disciplinary step
of the ASA process, (lower case terms in the figure).. To
all intents and purposes, they launch their analyses from
these narrow, discipline-oriented perspectives and do little
in any systematic way to escape the prejudices thereby inflic-
ted on the ultimate ASA product. In particular, they have no
well-developed rationale, - or, for that matter, concern -
with how best to iterate through the remaining steps of the
analysis.
The notjons of "Prescription","Description", and
"Embeddinlj" reflect some vague recognition of the need for
such a sequencing rationale, and for a means of relating
meaningfully to the broader policy design system. But, in
general practice, these ideas tend to become empty, meaning-
less and ambiguous. Prescriptive statements emerge under the
guise of system description; description of the status quo is
fobbed off as prescriptive analysis; and the useful concept
of embedding its stretched beyond its intended use to become
a sanctioning invocation for the most simplistic of assumptions.
WHAT WE DO NOW IN ASA: A DISINTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE
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